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Summary findings
Both public and private resources contribute to children's  In both urban and rural areas, they observe
nutritional status. And investments by one household  externalities from investments in sanitation made by
may improve health in other neighborhood households  neighboring households. They do not find the same
by improving the sanitation environment and increasing  externalities in the case of investments only in the
shared knowledge.  household water supply.
Alderman, Hentschel, and Sabates measure the  There is a direct link between the caregivers' education
externalities of investments in nutrition by indicating the  and their children's health status. Education transmits
impact of women's education in Peruvian neighborhoods  information  about health and nutrition.  It teaches
on children's nutrition  in other households, after  numeracy and literacy, 'which help caregivers read labels
controlling for those households' education and income.  and instructions. By exposing caregivers to new
They find that in rural areas this shared knowledge has a  environments, it makes then receptive to modern medical
significant impact on nutrition. The coefficient of an  treatment.  It gives women the confidence to participate
increase in the average education in the neighborhood is  in decisionmaking within a household, and it gives men
appreciably larger than the coefficient of education in  and women the confidence to interact with health care
isolation. That is, educating women in rural areas  professionals.
improves all children's nutritional status even for those
whose caregivers are themselves not educated.
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The nutritional  status of children  reflects the interplay  of household level decisions
regarding  food, health, and childcare.  These  decisions  are conditioned,  in part, by a
household's access to health and sanitation  services  as well as its ability  to make optimal  use
of its own and community  resources. A number  of empirical  studies have explored  the
contribution  of such community  resources to nutritional  status as well as the role education
plays in reducing  malnutrition.'  Most often these investigations  are framed,  implicitly,  if not
explicitly,  in terms of individual  resources and public goods.
This current study amplifies  such approaches  by recognizing  an additional
contribution  to child health through externalities  of the investments  of other households  in
the neighborhood,  hence the importance  of individual  resources  of other households  on the
nutritional  status of children.  In particular,  we look at the contribution  to nutrition outcomes
attributed  to the education,  water and sanitation  investments  of neighborhood  members  that
is additional  to the impact of a household's own assets.  2
Consider first the different  possible contributions  of education  on the nutritional
status of children. In addition to the indirect  impact of education  on nutrition through
increased household  income, schooling  may influence  nutrition by four channels
establishing  a direct link between education  of the caregiver  and their children:  (i) it
transmits information  about health and nutrition, (ii) it teaches numeracy and literacy,
thereby  assisting care givers in acquiring  information  including  reading labels and
instructions  on medicines,  (iii) by exposing  individuals  to new environments  it makes them
receptive  to modern medical treatment  and (iv) it imparts self confidence  which enhances
women's role in intra-household  decision  making and all individuals in their interaction  with
health care professionals.
1. See, for example, Thomas, Lavy, and Strauss (1996), Alderman and Garcia (1994) and Barrera (1990).
2. See, also, Stephens, (1995), Hughes and Dunleavy (2000), Hoque et al (1999) and Shi (2000).
1Glewwe (1  999) tests the relative role of the first three of these and finds that the
health knowledge  itself contributes  the most to child  health in Morocco. However,  he also
observes  that this is not part of the school curriculum.  Indeed, specific information  important
to health care may be obtained from interaction  with ones neighbors. The others pathways
by which education  may contribute  to child health are more directly  associated with formal
schooling,  but enhanced receptivity  to modem medical approaches  may also occur via
diffusion  by neighbors.  Similarly,  an illiterate caregiver  may prevail upon her neighbor to
explain the instructions  that come on the label of a medicine.  Thus, the schooling  of some
individuals  may contribute  to health over a wider net than does the individual's immediate
household.
Basu and Foster (1998) have formalized  a definition  of proximate literacy  that is in
keeping  with this view that knowledge  commonly associated  with formal schooling  can be
transmitted  by interaction  with others who have obtained this schooling.  Recently,  Gibson
(2001) has shown empirically  that externalities  from literacy may be appreciable within a
family. The current study takes the measurement  of externalities  one step further  by asking
if these externalities  are inter-household  as well.
In a similar vein, it is possible that investments  in water and sanitation  by some
individuals  will have an impact across the wider neighborhood.  Clearly investments in
household sanitation  have the potential  to reduce the bacterial count in the air and soil of the
neighborhood  and, thus, indirectly  benefit their neighbors.  It is less clear that individual
investments  in water supply assist other households  since the link to the community
environment  is weaker.  While access  to uncontaminated  water at home may improve
nutrition due to the reduction in its price and the attendant  increase of the quantity used for
cleaning as much as due to any increase in the quality of water that is drunk (Burger and
Esrey, 1994),  the impact on the bacterial count in the neighborhood  should be relatively
small. A possible externality  could arise,  however, if families  with access to quality  water
share this source with neighbors that do not have such access.  Even in such circumstances,
households  may permit access to their own water source for small amounts of drinking
water but be less willing to provide larger quantities  (e.g., for bathing).
There is little empirical  work on the impact  of such access to basic services or
education  at the neighborhood  level, i.e., at potential  positive (or negative) externalities  in
2the production  of child health. One exception  is Hughes and Dunleavy  (2000) who examine
the influence  of community  provision of basic services  such as water and sanitation  as well
as community  female education  in a reduced form mortality  hazard model for children
under the age of five in India. They do not find a synergy  between water supply and
sanitation  facilities in the sense that the mortality  hazard for a household with both a private
water supply  and private toilet facilities  is not significantly  different from  what would be
expected  by combining the separate effects  of water and sanitation.  Moreover, community
access  to toilets alone has no significant  impact  on child mortality  rates and the same is true
for community  access to water (alone)  in rural areas.  However,  when sanitation  and water
access  at the community  level are combined,  a joint externality  effect emerges which is
statistically  significant.
Another study that is closely  related to the analysis  presented here is Gragnolati
(2000).  He examines  the determinants  of children's  growth  in rural Guatemala, specifically
considering  the importance  of a number of community  variables that might be associated
with child anthropometry.  Gragnolati  finds that the proportion  of households  with piped
water connections  is positively associated  with children's  nutritional  status. Surprisingly,  the
height of rural Guatemalan  children is inversely  associated  with the proportion of
households  (per community)  with flush toilets.
Our approach, however,  differs from Gragnolati's  in an important  respect.
Gragnolati  treats own access  to basic water and sanitation  services as endogenous  to child
health, i.e., parents decide on both child health and access to basic services  jointly. To
accommodate  this, he does not include individual  access to basic services  in his model. In
such formulation,  it is not possible to distinguish  the additional  impact of the investments  of
the other households  in the community,  separate  from own access  to such services.  As this is
the primary focus of the current  paper, it is necessary  that we include both household and
neighborhood  infrastructure  in the regressions  reported.
32. Model and Estimation  Approach
We assume that the nutritional  status of a child is produced in a household through
the combination  of nutrients (F, food),  health (H), and child care (C). This can be
represented  by a nutritional status production  function,  which is conditional  on unobserved
child specific characteristics  including  genetic  potential (e), as well as on observed
neighborhood  environmental  conditions,  (E), and unobserved  comrnunity  effects, (s);
(1)  N 1 = N(Fi,  Hi, C 1, E, es,  6).
In principle,  such a production  function can be estimated  (Rosenzweig  and Schultz,
1988).  However,  the fact that the inputs are based on household choices which reflect the
household's assessment  of the unobservable  (to the researcher) child and community
specific characteristics  makes this approach dependent  on the ability  to accurately identify
and estimate  input demand functions.  An alternative  approach  is to begin with the
assumption  that a household  maximizes  utility  based on its consumption  of goods (G),
leisure (L) and the nutritional  status of the members of the household (or, more generally,
the human capital of its members).
(2)  U = u(G,L,N)
A household  maximizes  this subject  to the production  function expressed in equation
I as well as its budget constraint.  This results in an equation for nutritional status that is
analogous  to a commodity  demand equation.  Thus,
(3)  Ni = n(Y 1, Si, E, 6,  ij).
This equation reflects both the production  technology  and the household's demand
for health along  with its resource  envelope (Y for financial  resources and S for schooling  or
human capital).  In this equation Fj  represents  random error including unobserved  individual
endowments  (ei)  as well as measurement  error. The inputs of nutrients and health are not
included in this quasi-reduced form equation. 3 Instead,  the equation includes factors  which
determine  the level at which such inputs are used as well as the efficiency  by which they are
3. This is a quasi-reduced form since the equation includes income rather than the assets that produce it.
4combined.  While prices are elements  of the household's budget  constraint, they generally  do
not vary over a community.  Moreover,  since  the data used in this study (discussed  below)
come from a cross-sectional  household survey,  community  prices do not vary over time.
Thus, the price vector which conceptually  belongs in a reduced form equation for nutrition,
such as equation  3, gets subsumed  into the unobserved  community  effects, s.
3. Data
The Andean nation of Peru has been a nation of contrasts.  The country  is sharply
divided in three different climatic  zones - the Amazonian  jungle region in the East; the
central,  largely rural and indigenous  highlands  spanning  the center of the country from
North to South; and the Pacific Coast in the West with almost half of the urban population
of the whole nation living in- and around the capital Lima. While poverty and malnutrition
rates have decreased substantially  over the past years in Peru, they still remain at quite
alarming  levels. In 1997, about  half of the population  was poor and about every fourth child
was malnourished.  Key social indicators  are presented  in table 1.
Differences between living conditions  of the population in rural and urban areas
indeed remains strildng. Malnutrition  levels in rural Peru are more than three times as
high as in urban areas; for the severe poverty rate the factor is 2.5. Similarly, access to
basic services such as electricity, sanitation  and water is highly tilted in favor of towns and
cities. In 1997, only every tenth Peruvian in the countryside  had access  to a flush toilet
while eight out of ten Peruvians in cities commanded  such service.
Table 1. Basic Social Indicators, Peru 1994 and 1997
National  Urban  Rural
1994  1997  1994  1997  1994  1997
Malnutrition rate  30.0  23.8  17.4  12.2  44.7  37.3
Literacy rate  87.6  90.2  92.3  94.3  77.4  82.1
Poverty  rate  53.5  49.0  46.1  40.4  67.0  64.7
Severe  poverty  rate  18.8  14.8  12.9  9.3  29.5  24.5
Electricity  connection  68.8  73.7  93.7  97.4  23.2  30.3
Sanitation  connections  48.2  58.6  73.4  84.3  2.4  11.6
Water,  public  network  65.0  72.8  84.9  89.0  28.8  43.1
Source:  World  Bank  (1999,  p.10)
5To investigate  what is the impact  of these services  on nutrition, we use data from the
1997 round of the Peru Living Standards  Measurement  Study. This survey  was a multi-
purpose, modular, living standards  survey following  a format  utilized in over twenty
countries  (Grosh and Glewwe,  2000). While many of the variables such as infrastructure
and total expenditures  are based on household  data, the analysis  is performed  on individual
observations  of child heights  for children sixty months of age or less. 4 The total sample is
2,154 children below the age of five were recorded  in the survey,  more or less equally
divided by gender and among  urban and rural  populations  (see appendix table 1).
The measure of nutritional  status used in the study is height for age. This is
considered  a measure of long-run  nutritional  deprivation,  (Alderman,  2000; WHO, 1995).
This measure is converted  into standardized  units (Z scores)  after comparison  with the US
data chosen as an international  reference  by the WHO. The Z scores are derived after
subtracting  the age- and gender-specific  means from the reference  data and after dividing  by
the corresponding  standard deviation.  In the reference  population  2.3 percent have a Z score
below -2, while 16.0 percent are  below -1 Z score. These levels might be expected for a
normal population, and provide a basis for comparison.
Commonly,  rates of malnutrition  in a population  are based on the percentage  of
children  below the age of 5 whose z-score  is two standard  deviations  below the reference
value. This is the measure of malnutrition  reported in table 1. However, as there is no sharp
difference  in risk of mortality  or functional  impairment  at this or any other commonly used
cutoff level (Pelletier,  1994),  the regressions  reported below focus on nutritional status itself
and not the probability  of malnutrition  defined in terms of a Z score below -2. That is, the
dependent  variable is the Z score for height for age.
Of central  importance  to this paper is the definition  of the neighborhood  variables. In
all cases we derive the value of the variables  from non-self  means. These are derived  by
summing  the variable  of interest over the sample  cluster and then subtracting  the
observation  for the household and dividing  this difference  by the number  of households in
4. See Annex 1 of World Bank (1999) for a detailed description of the household survey and the method
of aggregation and deflating expenditures to obtain a consistent welfare indicator across households.
6the cluster minus one. There are 371 clusters  in the sample. Thus, clusters are relatively
small. This implies that the non-self estimates  are less precise than might be preferred.
However the errors in variable  problem should bias any parameters  towards zero and, thus,
towards an inappropriate  failure to reject  the null hypothesis  (that is, towards finding  that
community  effects are not important,  when, in fact, they are).  This will strengthen our case
in the event that we find significant  neighborhood  effects in the empirical  part of the paper.
We use the following definitions of'good' water and sanitation sources. For water,
both access to the public water net within the house and within the building qualifies as
'good' water access. All other options-well,  public standpipe, river, truck-are  left out
of the definition since the likelihood of contarnination of water from such sources is
considerably higher. Regrettably, such definitions can, obviously, capture the quality of
water and sanitation services only imprecisely since even a supposedly 'good' source of
water-like  the public net with an in-house connection-can  dispense contaminated
water.
Similarly,  for sanitation  facilities  we include  exclusive use for household members
(either through the public net or using a septic tank) as constituting  access  to 'good'
sanitation.  These facilities are assumed  to reduce the risk of unhygienic treatmnent  of human
waste as well as limiting exposure of the waste to flies that can transmit bacteria. Shared use
of hygienic facilities  and open disposal  of the human waste (in canals, roads or the open
field) are excluded from this definition.
The provision of water and sanitation  services  in urban Peru is very different
than in rural area. As shown in table 2, almost three-quarters  of the children  below the age of
five in our urban sample live in houses  with both proper water and proper sanitation  access
as defined above. The last quarter  is quite evenly split between the three remaining
possibilities:  having access to only water,  having access to only sanitation  or neither. The
rates of access  to water is for the children  in our sample is approximately  the same rate as
for households  in the urban population  overall (see table 1) while the access to sanitation  is
slightly  higher.  In rural areas, about 60 percent of children  in our sample lived in families
who had no access to water or sanitation  services  as defined  above. Less than ten percent
lived in households  with two services  while more than a quarter had only water services.
Extremely  few households (4 percent) had sanitation  services alone.
7Table  2. Access  to Household  Sanitation  and  Water  for Urban  and Rural  Peru
Rural Areas
With  no infrastructure  587
With  only  water  259
With  only sanitation  41
With  water  & sanitation  87
Total  Rural  Children  974
Urban
With  no infrastructure  120
With  only water  114
With  only sanitation  77
With  water  & sanitation  799
Total  Urban  Children  1,100
As is discussed further below, the fact that the overwhelming majority of urban
households have both quality sanitation and access to water needs to be considered when
assessing the impact of the infrastructure  of the remaining households in the
neighborhood. Similarly the analysis needs to accommodate  the fact that there are
comparatively  few rural observations  with good sanitation yet also do not have direct
access to piped water. The analysis that follows first classifies services in terms of having
none, one or two. We do this to get a perspective on potential returns from combining
services at the household as well as at the community level. Such returns of combining
services would exist if we were to find that the positive impact of having combined water
and sanitation services on nutritional outcome is larger than twice the impact of having
one service alone. Such argument could also be made at the community level. However,
we also address the question of the impact of sanitation and of water supply by including
these services as regressors explicitly This differs somewhat from the classification in
terms of the amount of services. Thus, the two approaches complement each other.
For the analysis of the amount  of services  we classify 191 urban observations  with
one service and 799 with two while we classify  913 as having water and 976 as having
sanitation.  For the rural population,  346 observations  are classified with water and 128  with
sanitation  while 300 have one service  and 87 have two.
84. Results
Our first estimations  start from the standard  literature  model of the production of
nutrition, i.e., without  the inclusion  of possible neighborhood  externality effects. The first
two columns  of table 3 present results of this standard  approach  to modeling nutritional
status and find, reassuringly,  that the results are consistent  with the wider literature.
For example,  as is generally  observed, heights  (standardized  for age) decline  over
the first year of life and then more or less levels off with little catch up. Also, income is an
imnportant  explanatory  variable  even after accounting  for the positive effects of maternal
education.  Indeed,  the magnitude  of the coefficient  of the logarithm  of expenditures  is
relatively  large compared to that estimated for other low and middle income countries
(Alderman  et al., 2000), but not unprecedented.
As expected,  household's own access  to sanitation  or water supply improves  the
nutritional  status of children living in the household;  and having both has a more favorable
impact  than having only one. Here, we find indeed  that having two services  has more than
double  the impact of having one service alone which would point towards the potential
existence  of returns of combining  services  to exist.
Also, as anticipated,  the indigenous  population is at a disadvantage  even after
controlling  for income, education,  and infrastructure  for which the population is at a
disadvantage.  This may reflect social exclusion  or differential  access to services  we cannot
capture here (e.g., consistently  worse quality of water). Or it may be due to a correlation  of
ethnicity  and altitude; the latter is known to influence  anthropometric  status (Haas et al.,
1982).  These are not mutually  exclusive  hypotheses.
9Table 3. Regressions  Explaining Child Heights
Pooled  Urban  Rural
Variables  Column  I  Column  2  Column  3  Column  4  Column 5
Constant  -3.449.  -3.640.  -3.888,  -4.215.  -2.974.
(.460)  (.451)  (.865)  (1.216)  (1.223)
Urban  .523*  .333***
(.094)  (.103)
Male  .040  .042  .039  .056  .009
(.061)  (.061)  (.060)  (.080)  (.088)
Age 7-12  months  -.530  -.534*  -.529*  -.325  -.770
(.167)  (.163)  (.163)  (.249)  (.200)
Age 13-18  months  -1.192  -1.190***  -1.207**  -1.167**  -1.275
(.137)  (.134)  (.135)  (.184)  (.202)
Age 19-24  months  -1.425*  -1.442*  -1.460***  -1.328**  -1.624*
(.142)  (.140)  (.141)  (.201)  (.186)
Age 25-36  months  -1.174'"  -1.187.  -1.213.  -1.179*  -1.287.
(.122)  (.119)  (.120)  (.171)  (.167)
Age 37-48  months  -1.197**  -1.216*  -1.239*  -1.302*  -1.168*
(.117)  (.115)  (.115)  (.161)  (.167)
Age 49-60 months  -1.456  -1.473*  -1.474***  -1.412***  -1.604***
(.117)  (.115)  (.115)  (.161)  (.165)
Indigenous  -.438*  -.314**  -.279**  -.211  -.252
(.124)  (.125)  (.124)  (.632)  (.123)
Logarithm  of income  .345*"  .374**  .334**  .297*  .391
per capita  (.064)  (.062)  (.071)  (.098)  (.101)
Male education  in years  -.011  -.018*  -.021*  -.015  -.030*
(.009)  (.009)  (.009)  (.011)  (.015)
Female education  in  .089  .074**  .056*  .056*  .052.
years  (.010)  (.011)  (.012)  (.016)  (.017)
Has sanitation  or water  .190"  .105  .173  .139  .171
supply  (.093)  (.091)  (.138)  (.204)  (.185)
Has both sanitation  and  .502  .211**  .211  .299  -.103
water supply  (.079)  (.090)  (.162)  (.193)  (.277)
Non-self  neighborhood  -.118  -.269  -.021
percentage  with one  (.165)  (.339)  (.213)
type of infrastructure
Non-self  neighborhood  -.031  -.012  .016
percentage  with both  (.198)  (.272)  (.332)
types of infrastructure
Non-self  average  .041  .217  -.188
logarithm  of  (.138)  (.205)  (.175)
expenditures
Non-self  female  .070**  .008  .171'
education  (.023)  (.030)  (.035)
R-square  .267  .280  .285  .189  .214
Number of observations  2084  2084  2084  1110  974
Robust standard  errors in parentheses.  *  significant  at 1 percent level. ** significance  at 5 percent
level.
10The absence of a significant  gender  effect is consistent  with results covering
populations  outside of south and west Asia. The only coefficient  in column one that is
unexpected  is the negative, albeit  insignificant,  impact of male education.  One can speculate
that this is related to the shifting  of consumption  patterns  to status goods, but we have  no
direct evidence.  In any case, the magnitude  is comparatively  small compared  to the positive
impact  of an additional  year of schooling  for women.
Column  two in table 3 includes  a dummy  variable  for the urban population. This
specification  dominates the former; we include  both to illustrate  the difference  in the
coefficients  of sanitation  and or water supply when the urbanization  variable is included.
Much of what is attributed to a household's own sanitation  or water in the first column is
absorbed  into the dummy variable  in the second. Nevertheless,  the effect of having both
forms of infrastructure  remains statistically  significant  from zero. However, controlling  for
regional variation  does have an impact  on the size of the parameters; the retums to
combining  services  at the household  level disappear.
The variables of prime interest  in this study, i.e., the non-self cluster means for both
the infrastructure  variables as well as female  education,  are introduced in the specification
reported  in column three. The education  of other women in the neighborhood  has a positive
impact on the nutrition of a child, even after controlling  for the education  and consumption
of the household  itself. 5 Indeed,  the coefficient  of an increase  in the average education  in the
neighborhood  being appreciable  larger than the coefficient  of education  in isolation.
However,  at first glance, there is little encouragement  for the hypothesis that the
prevalence  of sanitation  and water services  in the neighborhood  influences  the nutritional
status of a child.  According to these results,  no evidence  can be found for our hypothesis  of
neighborhood  externalities  in the production  of child nutrition in Peru. Indeed, the
percentage  of households  having one type of infrastructure  seems to have a negative
influence  relative  to the percentage  having either none or both. Again, however, the
coefficient  of the variable  is not significantly  different from zero.
IIThe results look equally  unsupportive  of this hypothesis  when the regressions are
run separately  for the urban and rural sub-samples  as shown in columns four and five. The
majority  of the point estimates  for the coefficients  in the sector  regressions are the same as
in the pooled regressions although  some precision is lost. This is especially  the case with the
variables  representing  relatively  small cells such as the variable for the urban indigenous
population and the few rural households  with both types of infrastructure.  The fact that the
neighborhood  education  of women is significant  only in rural areas is consistent with the
results reported  by Hughes and Dunleavy  (2000) who found that a high proportion  of
women with middle school education  or beyond significantly  lowers mortality  hazards only
in rural areas of India.
However, the regression specifications  in table 3 do not take into account the fact
that the average level of infrastructure  in rural commnunities  differs appreciably  from that in
urban areas.  If the impact of externalities  varies according  to the level of the household's
own investments  then the specification  for rural areas  may need to differ from that for urban
communities.  That is, to correctly  assess the externalities  we would have to limit our sample
to only those households that have a common sanitary  environment.  Table 4 presents a few
variations  from this perspective.
In column one of table 4 we confine  the sample  to the 799 urban observations  with
both types of infrastructure  (water  and sanitation)  within their household. This regression
can not include own infrastructure  since,  by design, there is no variation within the sub-
sample.  Both coefficients  of neighborhood  infrastructure  are now significantly  positive in
this specification,  although there is no difference  between  having one and having both in the
neighborhood.  Thus, the key finding  in this regression is that once one has taken into
account the sanitary  environment  within the household, there is an additional  impact  if the
neighbors have similar access  to such services.  We do not, however, find evidence  of returns
to combining  services at the community  level.
5. The impact of the average of education of men in the community  is not significant and we do not
include the variable in this or other models reported in the tables.
12Table 4. Regressions Results Allowing Parameters to Vary According to Existing Infrastructure
Restricted  Restricted
urbana  rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural
Variables  Column I  Column  2  Column 3  Column 4  Column S  Column 6
Constant  -5.597***  -2.749*  -4.449"  -2.961*  -4.217***  -3.014..
(1.452)  (1.633)  (1.202)  (1.218)  (1.191)  (1.214)
Male  .062  -.023  .060  -.000  .060  .004
(.084)  (.  109)  (.081)  (.087)  (.080)  (.087)
Age 7-12 months  -.322  -.924'*  -.318  -.776*'  -.320  -.770'
(.236)  (.237)  (.249)  (.200)  (.248)  (.200)
Age 13-18 months  -1.011"  -1.387'  -1.168'*  -1.273'"  -1.l64***  -1.261"*
(.202)  (.241)  (.184)  (.202)  (.183)  (.201)
Age 19-24  months  -1.007"  -1.696"*  -1.319'  -1.632'*  -1.318***  -1.603'
(.217)  (.234)  (.201)  (.185)  (.200)  (.184)
Age 25-36 months  -.978"'  -1.368'"  -1.178"  -1.298.  -1.170***  -1.289
(.189)  (.190)  (.172)  (.167)  (.171)  (.168)
Age 37-48 months  -1.147'  -1.260'"  -1.300'"  -1.178'"  -1.301***  -1.183"'
(.179)  (.186)  (.162)  (.167)  (.159)  (.167)
Age 49-60 months  -1.245"  -1.904'  -1.410"'  -1.617"  -1.406***  -1.615"'
(.175)  (.189)  (.162)  (.164)  (.159)  (.166)
Indigenous  -.217  -.342"  -.226  -.260"  -.215  -.231
(.672)  (.144)  (.630)  (.123)  (.636)  (.123)
Logarithm of income per  .304"  .200  .296.  .393"'  .290***  .369..
capita  (.090)  (.125)  (.099)  (.101)  (.099)  (.101)
Male education in years  -.018  -.017  -.014  -.030"  -.015  -.030"
(.012)  (.018)  (.011)  (.015)  (.011)  (.015)
Female education in years  .050'  .044"  .057"'  .053"'  .056***  .056'"
(.017)  (.023)  (.016)  (.018)  (.016)  (.018)
Has sanitation or water supply  .117  .177"
(.190)  (.108)
Has both sanitation  and water  -1.032  -.077
supply  (.650)  (.142)
Interaction of household has  .030
neither type of infrastructure  (.288)
with neighborhood  average
for one type
Interaction of household has  2.449
neither type of infrastructure  (1.122)
with neighborhood average
for both types
Interaction of household has  1.544"
both types of infrastructure  (.850)
with neighborhood average
for one type
Interaction of household has  1.411
both types of infrastructure  (.638)
with neighborhood average
for both types
Non-self neighborhood  1.559"  .076
percentage with one type of  (.864)  (.285)
infrastructure
Non-self neighborhood  1.425"  2.435'
percentage with both types  (.648)  (1.166)
13of infrastructure
Non-self average logarithm of  .235  -.026  .241  -.193  .196  -.171
expenditures  (.189)  (.219)  (.206)  (.174)  (.207)  (.177)
Non-self female education  .006  .184-  .002  .170"  .008  .171"
(.032)  (.042)  (.031)  (.035)  (.030)  (.035)
Water supply  .114  .255
(.240)  (.221)
Sanitation  .186  -.135
(.165)  (.167)
Neighborhood water supply  -.270  .414
(.249)  (.666)
Neighborhood sanitation  .471**  1.108-
(.232)  (.559)
Neighborhood water supply  -.584
squared  (.687)
Neighborhood sanitation  -1.317"
squared  (.604)
R-square  .167  .256  .191  .217  .220
Number of observations  799  587  1110  974  974
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent level. ** significant at 5 percent level.
a Sample restricted to households with both types of infrastructure.
b Samnple  restricted to households with neither type of infrastructure.
An analogous  argument can be made regarding  the rural population. Since few
households  in the rural areas command  both types of infrastructure,  the regression in column
two can not be specified exactly as with the urban regression.  Thus, for the rural population
we confine the sample to that subset of the rural  population which has neither water nor
sanitation  infrastructure  (587 observations).  In this regression  we find that those rural
households  with neither sanitation  nor piped water benefit from being located near
households  with both of these. We note, however,  that we only observe an important
neighborhood  effect for a combination  of water and sanitation;  the coefficient of having  one
type of neighborhood  infrastructure  is not significant  in column two. 6
Another way to allow for the fact that the impact of neighborhood  access is
mediated  by the household's own investment  is to use the full urban sample but to limit  the
parameter estimates  to only those households  that have a given level of infrastructure
supply.  We do this in a specification  for urban areas  by interacting  the neighborhood
14averages  of water and sanitation  with a dummy variable  for households  with both types of
infrastructure  (column  three). As indicated,  for those who have both a secure water supply
and good sanitation,  the nutrition of children improves  with the average level of
infrastructure  access within the neighborhood.  As we also include the average consumption
of the neighborhood,  this impact of infrastructure  is distinct from the overall effect (not
significant)  of being in a well off neighborhood. 7
Similarly,  the rural regression in column four of table 4 interacts the neighborhood
infrastructure with a dummy variable for those who do not have access to either type of
infrastructure  within their own home. As with column two, this specification confirms
that the infrastructure of neighbors affects those rural households who have neither
assured water or sanitation in their homes.
Nhile  we are able to distinguish the impact of neighborhood infrastructure
according to the level of the most common household infrastructure provision, we cannot
repeat this for all possible combinations. The share of the urban population with neither
sanitation nor good water is too small to run a regression with that sub-sample. Similarly,
too few rural residents have both types of infrastructure to run a rural regression
analogous to the urban regression in column three.'
We explore one further variation of the initial specification. Columns 5 and 6 of
table 4 indicate the results of explicitly distinguishing the role of sanitation and of water
supply. As mentioned, this differs a bit from the question of whether the impact of
6. We also  explored  whether  the impact  of the education  of other  women  in the conmunity  differs
according to the level of the education of women in the household.  The coefficient for the interaction (not
illustrated  here)  was  not  significant.
7. This specification includes the fMll  urban sample. Since the other coefficients in common with the
restricted sample regression (colurn  one in table 4) differ little in magnitude from the results in columnn
one this provides some assurance that selectivity does not affect the results.
8. However, we are able to explore the sensitivity of the results in table 4 by seeing if the results change is
we reclassify the infrastructure variables. For example, if we redefine the categories of rural infrastructure
into having i) either no infrastructure in the household or only sanitation water, ii) having only water or iii)
having both water and sanitation. As indicated  in table 2, this involves shifting 41 households. Estimating
this model (not reported in table 4) has the effect of reducing the coefficient of having one type of
infrastructure [that is, water] by 10% in a regression analogous  to that in column 2. As the standard error
increases by 4%, the coefficient  becomes statistically significant at only the 10% level. However, the
impact of the percentage of the commnunity  members with both types remains unaffected.
15services is cumulative since the groups having water may also have sanitation. In this
specification there is no apparent impact of having infrastructure in one's own household,
in either urban or rural neighborhoods. Nevertheless, in both urban and rural areas
neighborhood sanitation remains important. However, the coefficient on neighborhood
water supply is not significant in either sample. In the urban regression the inclusion of
quadratic terms renders all of the infrastructure  variables insignificant. Hence, the results
reported are for a linear specification.
However,  there appear  to be diminishing  returns to the impact of sanitation  in the
rural area. These  diminishing  returns are such that if the squared term is not included, the
coefficient  of neighborhood  sanitation  is not significant.  This specification  is not reported
nor are alternative  specifications  that included  the interaction  of neighborhood  sanitation  and
neighborhood  water supply since this variable  also was not significant.  As specified in
column six, the quadratic  implies  that the marginal impact  of additional  neighborhood
sanitation  declines (rather than levels off). It is zero when over 40% of the rural community
have improved  sanitation  in the household.  This value, however, is more than two and a half
times the average in the sample and would therefore  imply that positive neighborhood
externalities  in sanitation  will continue  to exist for the foreseeable  future.
5. Conclusions
This study has three principal conclusions. First, there are appreciable
externalities in the investment in household level infrastructure that carry over to
neighboring households. This is most apparent in the case of female education in rural
areas where the overall education of the neighborhood has a positive impact on
nutritional status regardless of the education of the child's own caregiver. Similarly, we
find that water and sanitation investments (or both) in the neighborhood appear to
influence a child's health after controlling for the immediate family environment in both
urban and rural areas although clearly not in an additive manner. In urban areas having
both does not have any more impact than having one while in rural areas those
households in our sample which benefit from the infrastructure in the neighborhood only
do so when both are present.
16However, our second main finding  indicates  that when we distinguish  the type of
services  rather than the number  of service  we find that the provision of sanitation  in the
neighborhood  dominates both sanitation  in the household and water supply  per se. This may
explain  why households  with no infrastructure  derive no measurable  impact from only one
service (columns  2 and 4, table 4) since in our rural sample  having one service usually
means  having water supply but not sanitation.
Our third conclusion  is that context matters. The impact of the neighborhood
infrastructure  differs not only between rural and urban but also at different levels of average
neighborhood  infrastructure.  According  to the results presented  here, the positive
externalities  for rural sanitation  would be highest at low levels of neighborhood  access  to
sanitation  and they would level off with increasing  service  provision. Such positive
externalities  exist until about half of the neighborhood  has access to sanitation.
Context also matters in another  way. A household's ability  to benefit from
investments  of their neighbors in water and sanitation  varies with its own access to such
services.  In urban areas, households  with their own infrastructure  benefit most from high
neighborhood  availability.  In contrast, in rural areas where the average level of
infrastructure  is low, households  with no infrastructure  benefit the most. As mentioned,  this
is likely due to the availability  in sanitation.  Further work using larger samples with greater
intra- and inter-community  variability  will likely yield additional  insights regarding  the
interaction  of services  at the household level and at the community  level.
17Appendix  Table 1. Means  and Standard  Deviation  for the Variables  in this  Study
Pooled  Rural  Urban
HeightforAgeZScore  -1.117  (1.511)  -1.604  (1.488)  -0.690  (1.398)
Male  0.504  (0.500)  0.495  (0.500)  0.512  (0.500)
Age 0-6 months  0.109  (0.312)  0.114  (0.318)  0.105  (0.307)
Age 7-12 months  0.097  (0.296)  0.104  (0.305)  0.091  (0.288)
Age 13-18 months  0.092  (0.289)  0.093  (0.291)  0.091  (0.288)
Age 19-24 months  0.090  (0.286)  0.081  (0.273)  0.097  (0.296)
Age 25-36 months  0.200  (0.400)  0.202  (0.402)  0.197  (0.398)
Age 37-48 months  0.202  (0.402)  0.199  (0.400)  0.205  (0.404)
Age  49-60 months  0.210  (0.407)  0.206  (0.405)  0.213  (0.409)
Indigenous  0.082  (0.274)  0.161  (0.368)  0.012  (0.108)
Logarithm  of income per capita  7.474  (0.556)  7.307  (0.515)  7.621  (0.550)
Female education in years  7.356  (3.948)  5.182  (3.104)  9.264  (3.610)
M4ale  education in years  7.127  (3.986)  5.424  (3.344)  8.622  (3.904)
Has  neither sanitation or water  0.339  (0.474)  0.603  (0.490)  0.108  (0.311)
supply
Has sanitation or water supply  0.236  (0.424)  0.308  (0.462)  0.172  (0.378)
Has  both sanitation and water  0.425  (0.494)  0.089  (0.285)  0.720  (0.449)
supply
Urban  0.533  (0.499)
Non-self  female education  7.469  (2.690)  5.345  (1.618)  9.333  (1.963)
Non-self  average logarithm of  7.649  (0.338)  7.486  (0.289)  7.792  (0.314)
expenditures
Non-self  neighborhood  percentage  0.320  (0.402)  0.580  (0.425)  0.092  (0.181)
with  neither type of infiastructure
Non-self neighborhood  percentage  0.246  (0.303)  0.329  (0.367)  0.173  (0.208)
witi one type of infrastructure
Non-self  neighborhood  percentage  0.434  (0.426)  0.091  (0.231)  0.735  (0.316)
with both types of infrastructure
Number  of observations  2,084  974  1,110
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